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In the May 2009 issue of PLoS Medicine,
Wu and colleagues presented the results of
a series of mathematical models that
examine how the use of influenza antiviral
drugs might influence the development of
antiviral resistance [1]. Their analyses
suggest that a small supplemental stockpile
of an alternative antiviral, in addition to a
primary stockpiled antiviral (oseltamivir for
every country that has stockpiled antivirals
to date), could reduce levels of resistance to
the primary drug during the early phases of
an influenza pandemic. The recent emer-
gence and spread of a novel influenza
A(H1N1) virus in North America makes
these results timely and potentially impor-
tant to the world’s response to this virus [2].
Canwe use the study byWu et al. to inform
current public policy development to
respond to this pandemic threat?
The authors used a standard compart-
mentalmodel—inthis case,onesimilar toa
susceptible–exposed–infectious–recovered
or SEIR model—to perform a series of
stochastic simulations. In their model,
infected individuals spent time first in a
latent stage, then in a presymptomatic but
infectious stage, and finally in either an
asymptomatic stage or a symptomatic
stage. At the beginning of a simulation,
only susceptible influenza strains existed in
the population; drug-resistant viral strains
arose at a fixed probability and only in
individuals receiving treatment. Using this
framework, the authors considered three
treatment scenarios. The ultimate objective
was to determine which strategy resulted in
the fewest pandemic influenza cases infect-
ed with an antiviral-resistant virus. These
scenarios were: (1) monotherapy using
oseltamivir, (2) early combination chemo-
therapy (ECC), and (3) sequential multi-
drug chemotherapy (SMC). The latter two
scenarios were the ‘‘hedging strategies’’
considered in this study. For these two
scenarios, a secondary antiviral stockpile
sufficient to treat 1% of the population was
established. In the ECC strategy, individu-
als receive both the primary and secondary
antiviral until the stockpile of the secondary
drug is depleted; thereafter, individuals
received only the primary stockpile. The
SMC strategy dictates that the secondary
antiviral was used until depleted and
thereafter the primary antiviral was used.
Based on the currently available medica-
tions, this secondary antiviral would be
either zanamivir (a neuraminidase inhibitor
like oseltamivir, but one with a different
resistance profile) or an M2 ion channel
inhibitor (either amantadine or rimanta-
dine). Using this model, the authors address
the important question of how best to
minimize antiviral resistance in circulating
influenza strains. It should be noted the
novel influenza H1N1 virus tested to date
have all demonstrated susceptibility to both
the neuraminidase inhibitors and resistance
to the M2 ion channel inhibitors (http://
www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/).
Several features of influenza viruses are
important in evaluating how well the
authors’ model can address their primary
question. One of these is the extent to which
drug resistance develops among influenza
viruses and how it becomes widespread. It is
u n k n o w nh o wr e s i s t a n c et oM 2i o nc h a n n e l
blockers or neuraminidase inhibitors rapidly
becamewidespread among various strains of
influenza A viruses. In particular, it is not
clear whether the spread of antiviral-resis-
tant viruses was due to a direct selective
advantage of the mutations responsible for
antiviral resistance or a ‘‘hitchhiker effect’’ in
which drug resistance mutations were car-
ried along with others that offered an
advantageous immunological niche for a
particular influenza strain. Their model
assumes that use of antivirals increases the
chance that resistant viruses will be isolat-
ed—and indeed a substantial correlation has
often been demonstrated between wide-
spread use of a particular antimicrobial
agent and the prevalence of resistant
organisms [3]—but the milieu in which
influenza antiviral drug resistance develops
is more complex. For example, from the
licensure of the neuraminidase inhibitors
oseltamivir and zanamivir in 1999 until
The Perspective section is for experts to discuss the
clinical practice or public health implications of a
published study that is freely available online.
Published June 30, 2009
Citation: Shay DK, Ridenhour B (2009) Can We ‘‘Hedge’’ against the Development of Antiviral Resistance
among Pandemic Influenza Viruses? PLoS Med 6(6): e1000103. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000103
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Public Domain declaration
which stipulates that, once placed in the public domain, this work may be freely reproduced, distributed,
transmitted, modified, built upon, or otherwise used by anyone for any lawful purpose.
Funding: No specific funding was received for this article.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: david.shay@cdc.hhs.gov
Abbreviations ECC, early combination chemotherapy; SMC, sequential multidrug chemotherapy
Linked Research Article
This Perspective discusses the fol-
lowing study published in PLoS
Medicine:
Wu JT, Leung GM, Lipsitch M,
Cooper BS, Riley S (2009) Hedging
against Antiviral Resistance during
the Next Influenza Pandemic Using
Small Stockpiles of an Alternative
Chemotherapy. PLoS Med 6(5):
e1000085. doi:10.1371/journal.
pmed.1000085
Mathematically simulating an influ-
enza pandemic, Joseph Wu and
colleagues predict that using a
secondary antiviral drug early in
local epidemics would reduce glob-
al emergence of resistance to the
primary stockpiled drug.
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remained at a low level, even in the
countries responsible for most of their use
worldwide [4]. When neuraminidase inhib-
itor-resistant influenza viruses were detected,
they were isolated from treated individuals
and generally showed reduced fitness, as
defined by their ability to transmit from
individual to individual [5]. These seemingly
well-established tenets had to be reevaluated
rapidly with the emergence of seasonal
influenza A(H1N1) viruses resistant to
oseltamivir in the 2007–2008 season [6].
These viruses were clearly transmissible
from person to person, and none of the 99
individuals infected with these viruses who
were carefully evaluated had been exposed
to oseltamivir prior to diagnosis [6]. More-
over, in some countries with high levels of
oseltamivir resistance (e.g., Norway), oselta-
mivir was only rarely prescribed, while
resistance was rare in Japan, where use of
this drug was the most common [7].
These basic questions surrounding the
epidemiology of antiviral resistance have
important ramifications for the use of
models in evaluating antiviral strategies.
Given the complexities of the relationships
between the use of antivirals and the
prevalence of infections with resistant viruses
at a country level, and our lack of
understanding of why transmissible oselta-
mivir-resistant viruses suddenly emerged,
including a parameter in the model to
account for a potential reduction in the
transmissibility of resistant viruses would
have been useful. The lack of a term for a
reduction in transmissibility may be a factor
leading to the high attack rates of antiviral-
resistant influenza produced by this model.
Another effect of not considering that lower-
fitness antiviral-resistant mutants may devel-
op is that the model represents essentially a
best-case scenario for hedging strategies
(because the numbers of antiviral-resistant
influenza cases against which to hedge may
have been artificially increased). Finally, the
assumption of a synergistic effect of two-
drug treatment among individuals receiving
ECC (i.e., the occurrence of resistance
becomes less likely) critically depends upon
the magnitude of this effect. ECC might
represent the optimal strategy if the syner-
gistic effect is as great as that suspected for a
combination of oseltamivir and amantadine,
based on in vitro results [8]. The magnitude
of any synergy coefficient has no effect on
the SMC or the monotherapy strategies. It is
also worth discussing the authors’ use of
fixed rates of acquisition of antiviral resis-
tance in their model. While they do consider
a plausible range of fixed rates, there are at
least two potential problems with their
approach: (1) published estimates of these
rates for oseltamivir and amantadine seem
to be at the higher end of the investigated
range (for which the model predicts the
choice between hedging strategies may
make little difference) and (2) the age of
the individual being treated has an effect on
the development of antiviral resistance,
suggesting that an age-stratified compart-
ment model would be more appropriate.
Use of such a model may (or may not)
produce different results; it would be
informative to check.
The authors used an extensive database
of air-travel data in this study, which
allowed them to model the dissemination
of infected individuals to a global network
of 105 cities based on known travel
patterns; in the modeled scenarios 28 of
these cities employed large-scale antiviral
campaigns (24 at random, with Hong
Kong, London, Geneva, and New York
always participating). The authors demon-
strate that applying an effective hedging
strategy at the source (Hong Kong in this
case)hasdramaticeffectsontheattackrates
of resistant viruses in the other three major
cities, and more globally as well. Of course,
the interpretation of this finding is contin-
gent upon the resemblance of this air-travel
model to the current, complex reality of
global travel patterns, not all of which can
be captured using data on regularly sched-
uled commercial airline flights.
The interpretation of results from all
influenza modeling studies depends on the
reasonableness of the input assumptions
used, in light of current epidemiologic
characteristics of the virus and its human
host and the relevance of the model outputs
to plausible public health interventions. As
the authors note, limitations of the current
study included an assumption that the
pandemic virus would be susceptible to
both antiviral agents in the putative
stockpile when it was detected at a major
city, and that its spread would occur
primarily to other major cities throughout
the world through air-travel routes. Anoth-
er limitation is the current lack of clinical
safety data for antiviral drug combinations.
As of late May 2009, the latest and most
pressing pandemic threat is a novel influ-
enza A(H1N1) virus resistant to the M2 ion
channel inhibitors that was first detected as
a cause of community-level respiratory
illness outbreaks in Mexico. This virus
spread to the United States quickly but
notsolelyoreven primarilybytheair-travel
network and has caused outbreaks in rural
and urban areas. For their work to be most
useful, modeling groups should work close-
ly with epidemiologists and public health
officials to evaluate control strategies that
appear feasible from epidemiologic, logisti-
cal, and regulatory perspectives. Collabo-
rations between modelers and public health
scientists are forming rapidly during the
current response to outbreaks of novel
H1N1 infections in the Northern Hemi-
sphere.Wehope suchcollaborationswill be
able to provide timely data to help inform
policy decisions regarding management of
novel H1N1 outbreaks in the Southern
Hemisphere in the next few months.
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